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JUDICIAL PROCESS AS AN EMPIRICAL STUDY: 
A COMMENT ON JUSTICE BRENNAN'S 
ESSAY 
Charles M. Yablon* 
I. LOOKING AT WHAT JUDGES ACTUALLY DO 
One of the enduring accomplishments of the Legal Realist move­
ment was to shift at least some of the attention of academic lawyers 
away from their favorite occupation—telling judges what to do—and 
to get them to consider what it is that judges actually do. The genera­
tion of legal scholars who immediately preceded the Realists had at­
tacked the formalism of judicial decisionmaking, criticizing judges for 
mechanically applying formal rules without considering social needs 
or public policy.' The Realists, while sympathetic to this prescriptive 
claim about the proper role of judges, added to it a descriptive claim, 
that judges did not in fact decide cases through mechanical applica­
tion of general rules, that such formal rules were indeterminate at the 
level of practice, and did not yield certainty or predictable results.^ 
Certainty and predictability, to the extent they existed in the legal 
system, were the product of the "personality of the judge," not the 
• Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, Yeshiva University. I am grate­
ful to David Rudenstine for his thoughtful suggestions on an earlier draft of this piece, and to 
Rick Antonoif for his careful and able research assistance. 
1 For example, Roscoe Pound's prescriptivist claim charged the formalists with using 
"mechanical" jurisprudence—empty words and meaningless deductions—achieving "unscien­
tific" arbitrary results. He proposed a study of law using pragmatic scientific methodology to 
achieve a "sociological" jurisprudence. See Pound, Mechanical Jurisprudence, 8 Colum. L. 
Rev. 605, 620-21 (1908). Joseph W. Bingham suggested that in order to examine what judges 
do, we must look at the results of their judicial process; the decisions themselves. This ap­
proach takes cause-and-effect analysis, as used in the natural sciences, grounding its conclu­
sions on empirical evidence. See Bingham, What is the Law? (pts. 1 & 2), 11 Mich. L. Rev. 1, 
11 Mich. L. Rev. 109 (1912). By moving the discourse into the science arena, these lawyers 
sought to derive knowledge of the judicial process by using scientific models and philosophical 
abstraction to provide a practical study of law that could resolve social problems. 
2 See K.N. Llewellyn, The Bramble Bush 4 (1960) ("men talk about contracts, and trusts, 
and corporations, as if these things existed in themselves, instead of being the shadows cast 
across the front stage by the movements of the courts unheeded in the rear"); Frank, What 
Courts Do In Fact, 26 111. L. Rev. 645, 648-51 (1932). 
It is therefore by no means certain that the court will leam the truth even about 
cases involving the simplest facts. And unless that is certain, then you cannot be at 
all sure, before the court has heard the case, what the decision will be. Not even if 
the rules were clear, definite and precise. 
Id. at 650. 
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formal rule structure.^ 
Others came forward to argue that the Realist position, if not 
wrong, was at least highly exaggerated. They argued that judges did 
indeed rely on formal rules in reaching decisions and that the areas of 
judicial freedom or creativity were, at best, rather circumscribed.^ 
Thus, for at least the last sixty years or so, the question of how 
judges actually decide cases has been a respectable academic question, 
and one that has engendered considerable academic debate. Some 
scholars have carefully observed, collected, and collated judicial be­
havior.' Others have conducted thought experiments involving a 
judge of superhuman intelUgence and knowledge, in the hope that 
describing how such a judge would decide cases can clarify the deci­
sionmaking processes of real judges.® Yet other legal scholars have 
sought to describe in great detail how they would go about deciding 
cases if they were judges.^ 
Amidst all this observing, theorizing, and describing, of course, a 
fairly obvious question emerges. Why not ask the judges? After all, 
seeking to describe what judges do is not like trying to describe the 
religious practices of the Etruscans or the migration routes of wild 
3 Having served eleven years as a judge, Hutcheson described the process of deciding the 
difficult case, saying 
I, after canvassing all the available material at my command, and duly cogitating 
upon it, give my imagination play, and brooding over the cause, wait for the feel­
ing, the hunch—that intuitive flash of understanding which makes the jump-spark 
connection between question and decision, and at the point where the path is 
darkest for the judicial feet, sheds its light along the way. 
Hutcheson, The Judgment Intuitive: The Function of the "Hunch" in Judicial Decision, 14 
Cornell L.Q. 274, 278 (1929). Hutcheson made this confession confident that other judges, 
too, decided cases intuitively. Id. See also Frank, supra note 2, at 655 (combination of judge's 
personality and innumerable stimuli produce decisions). 
* Hans Kelsen, for example, views the legal system as a hierarchy of norms, with rules at 
any level traceable to norms at still higher levels, culminating in the "basic norm," which is the 
premise of the entire system. See H. Kelsen, Pure Theory of Law 193-214 (1961). For Hart, 
the system consists of primary and secondary rules. Primary rules are the informal rules by 
which social existence is basically conditioned. When conditions change, these rules become 
uncertain requiring clarification from the secondary rules; which are the rules of recognition, 
rules of change, and rules of adjudication to determine "whether, on a particular occasion, a 
primary rule has been broken." H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law 94 (1961). 
5 e.g., Galanter, Reading the Landscape of Disputes: What We Know and Don't 
Know (and Think We Know) About Our Allegedly Contentious and Litigious Society, 31 
UCLA L. Rev. 4 (1983). 
6 See R. Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously 105-30 (1977). 
See Kennedy, Freedom and Constraint in Adjudication: A Critical Phenomenology, 36 
J. Legal Educ. 518 (1986). Professor Kennedy explores his own decisionmaking as he 
imagines it would be if he were a judge deciding a case that, for him, "present[s] a conflict 
between 'the law' and 'how-I-want-to-come-out.' " "The law" is the rule of law derived from 
precedent that is "expected" to control the case; whereas "how-I-want-to-come-out," is simply 
what it seems—Kennedy's personal preference as the outcome of the case. Id. at 518-20. 
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geese. Judges are not a vanished race, nor are they particularly hard 
to find. Moreover, they are highly intelligent and articulate people 
who seem perfectly capable of explaining, in whatever degree of detail 
is desired, what it is they do and how they go about doing it. 
Accordingly, it is at least somewhat surprising that judges them­
selves have not played a larger role in the academic debates about 
what judges do and how judges decide cases. The great exception to 
this generalization, of course, is Benjamin N. Cardozo, whose work, 
particularly The Nature of the Judicial Process,^ had a major impact 
on the study of judicial decisionmaking. But the paucity of judicial 
writing on this subject since Cardozo is a matter that merits some 
consideration. 
Two possibilities seem to exhaust the field—either judges do not 
want to tell us how they decide cases, or they are unable to do so. 
Let's consider the latter, and seemingly more implausible possibility, 
first. It seems difficult to believe that individuals whose job it is to 
decide cases, who do so on an almost daily basis, and who are adept at 
expressing the legal rationale underlying their opinions, should be un­
able to tell us how it is they make such decisions. Yet it may not be as 
implausible as all that, for reasons I hope to make clear below. 
Let's first make sure we understand what we are asking these 
judges to explain. We are not asking them to tell us the legal grounds 
supporting their decision. Judges do that all the time in the opinions 
themseilves. Moreover, such legal grounds are not hard for judges to 
find. They are contained in the briefs of the parties submitted to the 
court. In any competently lawyered case, a judge is likely to have, 
before he or she makes any decision, at least two briefs that together 
muster the strongest legal reasons that can be given for deciding the 
case either way. The question we are really asking then, when we ask 
how a judge decides a case, is how does a judge go about deciding 
which legal arguments are stronger, or, put a slightly different way, 
how does a judge decide which side deserves to win? 
It is not at all implausible that a judge, even an extremely skillful 
one, may not be able to articulate how he or she goes about deciding 
cases in this sense. There are many types of knowledge that we pos­
sess and are able to act upon, yet cannot be precisely articulated so as 
to enable others to act upon them in the same way. Wittgenstein pro­
vided a fine example when he asked: Do you know what a Haydn 
symphony sounds like? Can you tell me?' The point, of course, is 
that you may know very well what a Haydn symphony sounds like. 
* B. Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process (1921). 
® See L. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations 143 (1958). 
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You may even be able to pick Haydn works out from those of Mozart 
or early Beethoven. Yet it is unlikely that you can articulate for 
someone without your level of training and knowledge what precisely 
it is that you hear that enables you to distinguish Haydn from Mo­
zart, and even more unlikely that you can instruct them how to do the 
same thing. 
It is very possible that deciding cases, in the sense we are speak­
ing of it, is something like this. The trained judge may find it quite 
easy in many cases to distinguish good arguments from bad, meritori­
ous cases from frivolous ones, even when the formal structure of the 
arguments appears quite similar. Yet it may be impossible for a judge 
to articulate, in general terms, what makes a good argument good, a 
bad argument bad. The judge may be forced to resort, like the Haydn 
scholar, to examples. If we hear enough Haydn symphonies, and are 
not completely tone deaf, it is conceivable that we will eventually 
learn how to pick them out from other music. By the same token, if 
we read enough good and bad legal arguments, (and are not com­
pletely without rhetorical facility) we should eventually learn how to 
pick out the ones we are told are "good." Indeed, it is hard to see 
how contemporary law school pedagogy can be justified on any other 
grounds. 
Accordingly, we see that it is quite possible that judges cannot 
tell us how they decide cases. In fact, some of the most interesting 
jurisprudential writing from judges has come close to making such a 
declaration. Hutcheson wrote eloquently of the role of the "hunch" 
in judicial decisionmaking,'® and Cardozo too cautioned judges that 
their intuition was often a truer guide to "correct" decisions than 
analysis of doctrinal authority." But if in fact the nature of the judi­
cial decisionmaking process cannot be articulated, it is certainly 
within the power of judges to tell us that, and some indeed have. 
This brings us to the second possibility, that judges do not want 
either to tell us how they decide cases, or to confess that they cannot 
articulate how they go about doing so. The reasons for this may be 
entirely obvious and straightforward. Judges are busy people. They 
are also, by and large, practical people, who confront, on a regular 
basis, the manifestations of many of our most pressing social 
problems. It is not surprising, therefore, that of the minority of 
judges who choose to speak or write about the law in a nonjudicial 
capacity, most choose legal topics of more immediate practical con­
cern such as reform of the courts or the criminal justice system. 
10 See Hutcheson, supra note 3, at 278. 
11 Cardozo, supra note 8, at 113. 
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Yet one must also entertain the less obvious and more interesting 
possibility that writing about decisionmaking, in the sense we have 
been discussing it, may strike judges as inappropriate and perhaps 
even unwise. I do not mean this simply from a careerist point of view, 
although it is clear from recent events that extrajudicial writing can 
be injurious to higher judicial aspirations.'^ Rather, I am concerned 
with the more general and socially motivated claim that it is detri­
mental to society or the rule of law itself for judges to talk too much 
about how they decide cases. Even if one assumes that most people 
know that judges do not simply decide cases mechanically on the ba­
sis of preexisting rules, but rather have substantial choice in determin­
ing outcomes, one can still question whether it is a good idea to 
emphasize such judicial freedom and creativity. After all, the struc­
ture of the legal process is still designed to give the appearance of a 
formal process with a single right answer. Judges, by and large, still 
write their opinions syllogistically, describing their decisions as the 
formal application of controlling legal rules to particular facts. Law­
yers still appeal from those decisions by ascribing legal "error" to the 
opinion below. It would not be surprising if judges, used to speaking 
and thinking in these terms, would be apprehensive about adopting a 
mode of discourse that assumes a freedom and creativity their judicial 
opinions seek to suppress. 
These formal structures of determinacy still have real power, and 
we do not know to what extent public respect for law and the courts is 
tied up with them. For that reason, it is not at all inconsistent to 
recognize that there exists substantial judicial freedom, yet not wish 
to proclaim the fact too publicly. We have seen, therefore, that asking 
a judge to explain how he or she decides cases is not an easy assign­
ment. It requires serious insight and self-reflection on the part of the 
judge and a willingness to try to express his or her actions in a manner 
quite different from that of the judicial opinion. It requires a commit­
ment of time and energy and, perhaps most importantly, a willingness 
to break with traditional images of the judge's role, and a faith that 
providing greater insight into what judges actually do will strengthen 
public respect for the law and the judiciary. 
These observations, to the extent they explain the relative paucity 
of writing by judges about the judicial process, also help us appreciate 
the value of the essay by Justice Brennan to which this symposium is 
addressed. Judges rarely speak with so much frankness and insight 
'2 See, e.g., Cillers, The Compelling Case Against Robert H. Bork, 9 Cardozo L. Rev. 33 
(1987); Kurland, Bork: The Transformation of a Conservative Constitutionalist, 9 Cardozo L. 
Rev. 127 (1987). 
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about their role, and when they do we should take the opportunity to 
learn from them. In the next section, I want to do precisely that, by 
seeking to apply Justice Brennan's insights to an unresolved issue in 
the writing on judicial process. 
II. Two VIEWS OF JUDICIAL DECISIONMAKING 
The question I want to explore involves two different accounts of 
how judges make decisions when the case before them is not "con­
trolled" by prior precedent or statutory language. Virtually all mod­
ern commentators (and judges) agree that such cases exist, although 
they disagree vigorously as to the extent to which they predominate in 
the legal system. The notion of "controlling" precedent is itself part 
of the problem, since no case ever repeats identically the fact situation 
of a prior one, and no statutory language ever interprets itself. Hav­
ing made that obligatory bow to the deconstructionists,'^ the fact re­
mains that lawyers and judges are able to recognize many cases that 
are "controlled" by statute or prior precedent, but it is not uncom­
mon to read in many judicial opinions a declaration that the issue 
presented by the case is one of "first impression," for which neither 
prior cases, statutes, nor legislative history provide a dispositive an­
swer. The question then is, what does the judge do in such 
circumstances. 
One answer, and a prominent one in the legal literature, is that a 
judge in this situation is a lawmaker, a legislator, and what he or she 
does is legislate. That is, once the judge determines that the law has 
"run out," that preexisting legal rules provide no guidance for the 
particular decision at hand, a judge's decisionmaking process is basi­
cally the same as that of a legislator. She considers various legal rules 
that might be adopted, examines the likely consequences of each in 
light of her knowledge of American society, and chooses the one she 
thinks "best" in terms of the broad panoply of considerations—social, 
economic, political, and equitable—that go into any legislative 
decision. 
This assertion, that the decisionmaking process of the judge in 
situations where the law has "run out" is essentially a legislative one, 
can be found in a number of prominent commentators on the nature 
of the judicial process. It is probably most closely associated with 
Cardozo himself, who summarized with typical eloquence his view of 
the similarities between the judicial and legislative role: 
Each indeed is legislating within , the limits of his competence. No 
13 See Balkin, Deconstructive Practice and Legal Theory, 96 Yale L.J. 743 (1987). 
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doubt the limits for the judge are narrower. He legislates only be­
tween gaps. He fills the open spaces in the law. . . . None the less, 
within the confines of these open spaces and those of precedent and 
tradition, choice moves with a freedom which stamps its action as 
creative. The law which is the resulting product is not found, but 
made. The process, being legislative, demands the legislator's wis­
dom." 
A similar \i0w was expressed by H.L.A. Hart, who, in The Con­
cept of Law, noted that: 
Here at the margin of rules and in the fields left open by the theory 
of precedents, the courts perform a rule-producing function which 
administrative bodies perform centrally in the elaboration of varia­
ble standards. In a system where stare decisis is firmly acknowl­
edged, this function of the courts is very like the exercise of 
delegated rule-making powers by an administrative body.'' 
This account, which I call the "legislative" theory of judicial 
decisionmaking, views the preexisting legal system as having a deter­
minate scope. A legal question may either fall within that scope, in 
which case the question is controlled by prior authority, or it does not 
fall within the scope of preexisting legal rules. In such a case, the 
"law" has nothing to say to a judge, who must, as Cardozo tells us, 
exercise a "legislative wisdom" in promulgating a new rule best suited 
to the needs of society. However, as Hart reminds us, these newly 
produced rules themselves become a part of the "law," bringing more 
legal questions within its determinate, but ever-expanding scope. For 
our purposes, however, the key assertion of the legislative theory is its 
claim that if a judge is presented with a novel legal question, one be­
yond the scope of the preexisting rules, then the "law" is irrelevant to 
that decision, just as it is irrelevant to a legislative decision. Conse­
quently, in evaluating such a decision, one can speak of it as wise or 
foolish, well or poorly tailored to the needs of society, but not as "law­
ful" or "unlawful," or "correct" or "incorrect" in terms of the preex­
isting "law." 
The alternative account of judicial decisionmaking, which I call 
"intuitionist," also recognizes that legal materials may fail to "con­
trol" the specific legal issue presented, yet this theory denies that 
under such circumstances, the judge simply legislates the best or most 
useful rule. Rather, this theory claims that there is always "some­
thing else," to which the judge can resort in reaching a decision. The 
theory presupposes that there is some aspect of judicial decisionmak-
Cardozo, supra note 8, at 113-15. 
15 H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law 132 (1961). 
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ing which renders it qualitatively diflFerent from legislative decisions, 
even when the question presented is not "controlled" by any preexist­
ing legal authority. 
The various theorists I would lump together as "intuitionists" do 
not agree as to what the "something else" is that judges bring to the 
judicial decision. Frank wrote of the importance of the judge's 
"hunch" as the determining factor in most litigated cases,'® and 
Hutcheson extensively analyzed and extolled "the judgment intui­
tive." The notion that there is a uniquely judicial quality of mind, 
involving "openness" and "neutrality" is central to Hart and Sachs 
account of the judicial process.'' The uniqueness of the judicial mode 
of decisionmaking as a shared interpretive enterprise figures promi­
nently in Ronald Dworkin's recent work.'® 
While Dworkin, Hart and Sachs, and Frank are not usually 
thought of as sharing a single legal philosophy, it is clear that on this 
issue, they do share certain beliefs." The intuitionists would all claim 
that the fact that one is acting as a judge constrains and limits one's 
decisionmaking in ways legislators are not constrained. Judges must 
always take the "law" into account, even when the case before them is 
not controlled by prior authority. Accordingly, their decisions may 
be evaluated not only as wise or foolish, but in terms of some notion 
of "correctness" or "appropriateness" within the prevailing rule 
system. 
The legislative theorists would counter that these supposed 
unique judicial considerations do not constrain judicial choices at all, 
but merely determine the form and style in which they are expressed. 
The judge, like the legislator, first decides what the best rule is, and 
simply writes it in an opinion rather than a statute. 
What we have then are two differing empirical accounts of what 
it is that judges do when deciding cases that are not controlled by 
16 Frank, supra note 2, at 655-56. ,. j » r 
11 See H. Hart & A. Sachs, The Legal Process; Basic Problems in the Making and Applica­
tion of Law (tent. ed. 1958). 
18 See R. Dworkin, Law's Empire (1986). 
1' They all agree that when authoritative legal materials run out, the judge does not simply 
choose the rule she thinks will be "best" in light of all the competing societal considerations, 
but rather applies a uniquely judicial mode of arriving at the appropriate result. True, the 
intuitionists are never particularly clear on what this unique judicial mode of decisionmaking 
is and it takes rather different forms in the works of the different scholars on the intuitiomst 
side of this grand dichotomy. For Hutcheson and Frank, it is just a hunch, an intuition, which 
remains mysterious and unanalyzable. See Frank, supra note 2, at 655-56; Hutcheson, supra 
note 3. For Hart and Sachs, it is a certain psychological attitude toward judging, an openness 
and neutrality with respect to opposing positions. For Dworkin, at l^t in his n^t i^nt 
formulation in Law's Empire, it is a shared involvement in an interpretive project. See Dwor­
kin, Law's Empire (1986). 
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authoritative legal materials. The legislators claim that under such 
circumstances, the judge freely chooses that rule which he or she indi­
vidually determines best serves the needs and welfare of society. The 
intuitionists claim that the judge, acting as judge, can make no such 
free and individual choice, but is always constrained and limited by 
considerations unique to the judicial role. 
Put this way, these diflfering accounts of the judicial process ap­
pear to be empirically testable, at least insofar as the judge's percep­
tion of his or her own decisionmaking process is thought to provide 
evidence of that process. The legislative model implies that judges, at 
least in some class of cases, feel themselves free to make whatever 
decision is in the best interests of society, based on their own percep­
tion of society's interests. The intuitionist model, by contrast, sug­
gests that judges should feel, even in cases not controlled by 
authoritative legal materials, a push or constraint causally related to 
his or her understanding of the legal rule structure which, while not 
necessarily dispositive, limits or pushes the decisionmaking process in 
a certain direction. 
III. JUSTICE BRENNAN'S LEGAL TRADITION 
Which of these models, then, constitutes the view of judging set 
forth by Justice Brennan? The legal world Justice Brennan describes 
seems, at first blush, to bear far more resemblance to that of the intui­
tionists than that of the legislative theorists. Justice Brennan never 
describes himself as facing a judicial tabula rasa, a legal question in 
which authoritative legal materials have "run out" and he is free to 
decide whatever way he likes. Quite the contrary. Justice Brennan 
tells us that the world is not merely full, but overflowing with legal 
authority. Every time a litigant asserts a claim of due process, that 
litigant invokes a legal tradition deeply rooted in Anglo-American 
law. Justice Brennan makes it clear that in ruling on claims of due 
process, even novel claims not controlled by prior due process deci­
sions, he, as a judge, must take into account that due process tradi­
tion; the historical form it has taken; and the way that tradition 
relates to, and will be affected by, the particular decision he is called 
upon to make in each case. Justice Brennan tells us that authoritative 
legal materials can have causal influence even when operating at very 
high levels of generality. The more fundamental and pervasive a rule 
is in our legal culture, the more real are its "penumbras" or "emana­
tions" (those curious mystical phrases that enliven constitutional law) 
in that they continue to influence the thinking of judges, even after the 
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judge realizes that prior interpretations of the rule are not dispositive 
of the issue in the present case. 
Justice Brennan, unlike the legislative theorists, does not view 
these general due process concepts as simply vague rhetorical formu­
las that may be invoked with equal validity and likelihood of success 
by either side in a due process argument. Rather, he sees them as 
carrying real weight, as lending credence to certain arguments that 
invoke the tradition in appropriate ways, and as weakening or dis­
crediting other arguments that utilize a concept of due process which, 
while formally consistent with prior precedent, may nonetheless be 
inconsistent with the broader understanding of that concept dominant 
in the legal community and in the mind of the judge. Justice Brennan 
recognizes, of course, that the dominant understanding of these tradi­
tions can and will change over time, but that this does not negate the 
fact that, at any given time, a dominant conception will render vari­
ous arguments about the due process clause "stronger" or "weaker" 
even in the absence of controlling precedent. 
Thus far, Justice Brennan's views seem in hne with the intuition-
ist account of the judicial process. He agrees that, even when there is 
no controlling precedent, there is "law" in the form of vaguer and 
more general legal traditions or concepts, which still enter into the 
uniquely judicial form of decisionmaking in a way legislators do not 
experience. Justice Brennan departs from the intuitionist model, 
however, by also presenting us with a picture of the judge as an indi­
vidual, experiencing and sometimes struggling with the legal tradi­
tions under which he or she is operating and looking for ways to 
judge, evaluate, and critique them. This judge looks more like that of 
the legislative model, a strong-willed social critic who can, and does, 
shape the law in accordance with his or her independent social vision. 
But unlike the judge envisioned by the legislative model, who is sim­
ply free to make the law when authority runs out. Justice Brennan's 
judge must work to attain the freedom to change the law, must work 
to alter the dominant understandings so as to comport more closely 
with his or her individual conception of social justice. 
Since Justice Brennan's legal world is filled with prevailing tradi­
tions and conceptions which push judicial outcomes in certain direc­
tions, he must, if he seeks to move the law in a different direction, 
confront and deal with those traditions. It is here that Justice Bren­
nan invokes "passion" to counteract the claims of "reason," but his 
conception of passion is not irrational or anti-rational; it is simply a 
perspective of the world that is outside prevailing legal categories. 
For Justice Brennan, the dominant legal categories and traditional us-
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ages are the conventional modes of legal "reason," and to go outside 
those categories involves exercising "passion." 
The availability of these outside perspectives may make it seem 
that the judicial process is simply a matter of technique or craft, of 
finding the perspectives that permit one either to preserve or alter the 
dominant conception. Obviously, there is a large element of tech­
nique or craft in legal advocacy, and a judge, particularly an appellate 
court judge, must exercise such advocacy skills frequently. But when 
Justice Brennan describes that effort involved in applying passion to 
legal reasoning, he is speaking of more than just effective advocacy. 
He is speaking of convincing himself. "Passion" for Justice Brennan, 
seems to involve a broadening of one's own perspective, a way of look­
ing at legal questions from outside traditional legal categories. Some­
times these perspectives reveal to him the inadequacies of the 
traditional legal categories, providing powerful arguments for change. 
Sometimes they do not. 
Justice Brennan's discussion of Goldberg v. Kelly nicely illus­
trates many of these themes. The case was one of first impression, in 
that the Court had never before ruled on whether a hearing was re­
quired before benefits to a welfare recipient could be terminated. Yet 
Justice Brennan does not approach the problem as a legislator, weigh­
ing the costs and benefits of holding such hearings, or even asking 
such basic questions as whether the preexisting system led to substan­
tial numbers of improper terminations. Rather, he views the appro­
priate inquiry as a legal question, involving the scope and application 
of the due process clause. His inquiry is accordingly directed at deter­
mining how the due process clause affects this issue, not at simply 
determining what the best social policy is. 
Having determined that the case must be decided by some analy­
sis or interpretation of the legal meaning of due process. Justice Bren­
nan then confronts the standard Realist dilemma. Perfectly plausible 
arguments can be made, based on well-established due process princi­
ples, both in favor of and against the requirement of a pretermination 
hearing. Certainly it is consistent with well-established due process 
notions to argue that formal trial-type procedures should be instituted 
before the state terminates a "property" interest consisting of a well 
founded expectation of future benefit payments. Such an argument, 
utilizing preexisting categories of due process analysis and seeking, by 
reasonable analogy to prior cases, to expand the boundaries of such 
categories, seems to Justice Brennan a "rational" argument. 
20 397 U.S. 254 (1970). 
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By the same token, however, the dominant imderstanding of the 
due process clause, as set forth in prior cases, was that it did not al­
ways require a trial-type hearing prior to a taking, as long as the state 
had maintained other adequate safeguards against arbitrary action. 
Justice Brennan points out that, in Goldberg, the seven-day notice 
provision, right to submit a written statement, review procedures, and 
right to a post-termination hearing, could well have been considered 
to provide such adequate safeguards. Indeed, when coupled with the 
standard judicial reticence to overturn state procedures, particularly 
on constitutional grounds. Justice Brennan strongly hints that this 
would have been a winning argument, as long as the advocate stayed 
within preexisting legal categories. 
Notice that this account thus far parallels, in many ways, intui-
tionist claims about judicial decisionmaking. Even though the deci­
sion is not controlled by prior precedent, the terms of the dispute are 
shaped by it, and the judge, by close attention to the argument, devel­
ops a sense as to which is the "stronger" or more appropriate applica­
tion of preexisting due process concepts to the case at hand. 
But the Court in Goldberg did not rule that the notice provision, 
the post-termination hearing and the other procedures provided ade­
quate safeguards. And, Justice Brennan tells us, it did not rule that 
way beca\ise the Court was made aware of the "drastic consequences 
of terminating a recipient's only means of subsistence."^' The argu­
ment was not that termination of welfare benefits was like other tak­
ings of property, but that it was different, in that an individual 
deprived of basic requirements of subsistence was unlikely to pursue 
post-termination remedies, no matter how adequate under traditional 
due process standards. Thus, the argument that persuaded the Court 
(and presumably persuaded Justice Brennan as well) was not one that 
simply invoked preexisting legal categories, but one that functioned 
simultaneously as both a critique and an application of preexisting 
due process concepts. 
The decision in Goldberg v. Kelly, as Justice Brennan presents it, 
was neither required by preexisting authority, nor created by legislat­
ing jurists. Rather, it was the result of a unique form of judicial work: 
the effort to reconcile legal categories and concepts, which all legal 
actors use to make sense of legal questions, with the broader set of 
facts, beliefs, information, and generalizations that we all use to make 
sense of the world. In Goldberg, certain facts about the nature of wel­
fare and welfare recipients were used to undermine and alter prevail-
21 Brennan, Reason, Passion and "The Progress of the Law," 10 Cardozo L. Rev. 3, 20 
(1988). 
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ing legal understandings of due process. Yet in other situations, as 
Justice Brennan tells us, new facts and alternative perspectives may 
not be able to alter prevailing legal understandings. This process of 
seeking to convince and persuade is itself one in which outcomes can­
not be fully predicted.^^ 
CONCLUSION 
Justice Brennan's essay does not seek to provide a theory of judi­
cial decisionmaking, and although I have sought to generalize on the 
basis of his insights, I do not mean to turn it into one. The essay is far 
more rare and valuable as one judge's account of what the actual ex­
perience of the decisionmaking process is like. It reminds us of the 
difficulty any theory has of capturing the complexity of human experi­
ence. Nonetheless, it is only through categorizing and generalizing 
about human experience that we can talk about, study, and thereby 
aggregate our insights into the nature of our shared experience. Jus­
tice Brennan's essay suggests that legal authorities may also function 
as a set of generalized attitudes and conceptions that provide coher­
ence and insight about the world of social relations, but that never 
fully capture the complexity of that world. Accordingly, the legal 
system always remains open to critique or change by fresh insights or 
perspectives from that larger social world that the preexisting legal 
structure failed to fully capture or appreciate. 
For Justice Brennan, the mechanism for such change is the deci­
sionmaking process of the judge himself or herself, who, although 
trained and inculcated with the prevailing legal categories and con­
ceptions, must also remain open to arguments based on differing per­
spectives that reveal aspects of social reality not dealt with by 
prevailing legal concepts. Such a judge is, in some respects, like an 
artist simultaneously interpreting and expanding a particular artistic 
tradition, and in some respects, like a scientist, always open to revi­
sion of his or her theoretical presuppositions in the face of new data. 
Nonetheless, as Justice Brennan makes eminently clear, such a judge 
also possesses a kind of skill and imagination that is unique to the 
judicial craft. 
22 Cf. J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice 48 (1971). Rawls' idea of "reflective equilibrium" 
describes a process whereby one's intuitive and nonreflective decision about a set of facts is 
subsequently modified and justified by theoretical and structural deliberation of legal princi­
ples, ultimately resulting in a satisfactory judicial decision. See also Kennedy, supra note 7 
(describing a process of squaring intuition with legal principle). 
